Brexit and the EU in Global Climate Governance by Dupont, Claire & Moore, Brendan
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 51–61
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i3.2137
Article
Brexit and the EU in Global Climate Governance
Claire Dupont 1,2,* and Brendan Moore 3
1 Department of Public Governance and Management, Ghent University, 9000 Ghent, Belgium;
E-Mail: claire.dupont@ugent.be
2 Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
3 Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK;
E-Mail: brendan.moore@uea.ac.uk
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 30 March 2019 | Accepted: 24 August 2019 | Published: 16 September 2019
Abstract
Climate change governance is one of the EU’s priorities. The EU has developed a central (and arguably, a leading) role in
global climate governance. The UK has been an important supporter of strong climate action both within the EU and in
international climate negotiations. We investigate how/whether the EU’s role in global climate governance will be affected
by Brexit by focusing on potential changes in three conditions for EU leadership: (1) credible and ambitious internal climate
policy; (2) constant and effective international engagement through climate diplomacy; and (3) the ability to attract follow-
ers.We find that the UK has sometimes played the role of a pivotal outlier, either pushing for more internal policy ambition
or blocking certain policy options. Brexit is likely to have cumulative effects on the EU’s role in global climate governance
over the long term, through a series of changes in internal EU policymaking and climate diplomacy. The speed and scope
of these changes depend on the nature of the future UK–EU relationship. We argue that the broader international context
and strains on EU unity represent more urgent challenges to the EU’s role in global climate governance than those posed
by Brexit.
Keywords
Brexit; climate change; EU Emissions Trading System; European Union; leadership; UN climate negotiations; United
Kingdom
Issue
This article is part of the issue “The Impact of Brexit on EU Policies”, edited by Ferdi De Ville (Ghent University, Belgium)
and Gabriel Siles-Brügge (University of Warwick, UK).
© 2019 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Climate change governance is one of the EU’s priorities.
The EU has adopted targets to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, including a 40 per cent reduction by
2030 compared to 1990 levels, and has implemented a
range of policies to achieve its goals. It has developed
a central role in global climate governance through its
climate diplomacy and by standing as an example of cli-
mate action. Indeed, the EU is often extolled for its cli-
mate leadership ambitions.
The UK has been an important supporter of strong
climate action both within the EU and in international
climate negotiations. It has been influential in strength-
ening EU policy ambition and in the choice of internal
EU policy instruments. We are interested in investigating
how/whether the EU’s role in global climate governance
will be affected by Brexit.
The article proceeds as follows: In the next section,
we outline a framework for understanding the EU’s role in
global climate governance, building on leadership schol-
arship that highlights the importance of internal policy,
external diplomacy and gaining followers for exerting
leadership. We then examine the UK’s role in both EU
internal climate policy, focusing on the development of
the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and in the inter-
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national climate negotiations. To do so, we draw on exist-
ing literature, document analysis, expert interview data
and institutional voting statistics. We find that the UK has
played an important role in EU climate policy and diplo-
macy, but that its role has gradually become less central
over time. Next, we assess what these findings mean for
the potential effect of Brexit on the EU’s role in global cli-
mate governance. We find that changes after Brexit are
likely to lead to cumulative effects over the long term, and
that the speed and scale of changedepends on the nature
of the future UK–EU relationship. We argue that the EU
faces other, more pressing challenges to its global climate
role than Brexit, including the international climate con-
text, EU internal unity and broader EU reform processes.
2. Understanding the EU’s Role in Global Climate
Governance
The EU has long aimed for international leadership on
climate policy and governance (Bäckstrand & Elgstrom,
2013; Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008). It has managed to
achieve a certain leadership status (Parker & Karlsson,
2015), but the type and style of leadership shifted from
rhetorical leadership in the 1990s, with little concrete
policy action to follow up on stated commitments, to ex-
emplary leadership in the late 2000s, with the adoption
of domestic policy measures. The UK has been an inter-
national climate actor in its own right and also a contrib-
utor to EU global climate governance efforts. We seek to
assess how Brexit could change the EU’s role in global cli-
mate governance. For our analytical framework,we build
on EU climate leadership literature.
What are the ingredients for climate leadership?
Beyond the broader international political, economic
and social context (Dalby, 2013; Dupont, Oberthür, &
Biedenkopf, 2018; Lockwood, 2018), three main condi-
tions seem to be important for an international leader-
ship role: (1) credible and ambitious internal climate pol-
icy; (2) constant and effective international engagement
through climate diplomacy at multi-lateral and bi-lateral
levels; and (3) the ability to attract followers (Wurzel,
Connelly, & Liefferink, 2017).
First, ambitious internal climate policy can be under-
stood in twoways: either as policy that ismore ambitious
than the next most ambitious actor in terms of expected
reductions of GHG emissions; or as policy that is ambi-
tious enough to help achieve the calls for limiting global
temperature increase to well below 2° Celsius, as out-
lined in Article 2 of the 2015 Paris Agreement (UN, 2015).
Thus, the level of policy ambition depends on the bench-
mark. In addition, the credibility of climate policy also de-
pends on its implementation and feasibility: There is no
point agreeing on ambitious targets if they cannot be im-
plemented. By meeting these two conditions (ambition
and credibility), the EU’s internal policy can serve as an
‘example’ to other jurisdictions.
Second, constant and effective international engage-
ment through climate diplomacy means that the EU it-
self has the capacity to emphasise climate governance
at both the international, multilateral level, and in bi-
lateral relations. What makes climate diplomacy effec-
tive often depends on the broader context, the exter-
nal partner and the capabilities/room for manoeuvre of
the negotiating parties. Certain aspects are nevertheless
within the EU’s control. Adelle, Biedenkopf and Torney
(2018) lay out three strategies of EU external climate pol-
icy/diplomacy: engaging in dialogues and negotiations;
altering utility calculations; and building the capacity of
others to act. This implies that a high degree of EU con-
sistency, capacity and willingness is required on several
diplomatic fronts to achieve the desired result.
Third, exerting leadership at the global level implies
that other parties are following suit. So far, literature on
the EU’s global role in climate governance has shown
a limited number of ‘followers’, as few other jurisdic-
tions have engaged in policy development to the same
scale and scope as the EU (Kulovesi, 2012; Parker &
Karlsson, 2015; Torney, 2019). However, followership
could also be conceived in terms of the diffusion of pol-
icy ideas/instruments from the EU (Jordan & Huitema,
2014). While a particular policy ambition or instrument
may not be exactly copied, this does not necessarily im-
ply that EU climate leadership is unsuccessful. Policies
and ambitions in other jurisdictions may have at least
been inspired by the EU.
Before any of these conditions can be met, there is
already an assumption that the EU is a single actor, ca-
pable of communicating a unified message on the global
stage. Of course, the EU is not a single unit: it is a col-
lection of member states and supranational institutions
negotiating among themselves to reach decisions about
the way forward for internal policy and external strate-
gies in climate governance. For the EU to be considered a
legitimate, unitary actor, Vogler (2017) suggests four con-
ditions that ought to be met: autonomy, volition, negoti-
ating capability, and the ability to deploy policy instru-
ments. The EU has the capacity to act on each of these
areas in global climate policy (Dupont, 2019), making it a
legitimate actor according to these criteria.
How does the UK contribute to the EU’s global cli-
mate role? Building on the discussion by De Ville and
Siles-Brügge (2019), the UK has sometimes acted as a
‘pivotal outlier’ (see also Smith, 2019), sometimes as a
‘liberal and awkward partner’. Whether the UK will con-
tinue to play these roles in the future is uncertain. But
Brexit presents challenges to the EU’s global role in cli-
mate governance. The challenges are expected to play
out over the long term, and removing the UK from the
EU’s internal policy development and the EU’s climate
diplomacy is likely to result in changes in: (1) the credi-
bility and ambition of EU internal policies; (2) the consis-
tency and effectiveness of climate diplomacy; and (3) the
ability to attract followers. The speed and scale of the
changes (both to policy and to diplomacy) are likely to
depend to a considerable extent on the nature of the
future UK–EU relationship on climate governance. The
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closer the cooperation and alignment between the two,
the smaller the divergences are likely to be. Even so, over
the long term, we would expect to see cumulative ef-
fects of divergences—possibly the result of small, itera-
tive, even unintended changes in institutional structures
and actor behaviour (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019) as
the UK adopts domestic climate legislation and the EU
engages in its usual processes of internal policy develop-
ment and climate diplomacy after Brexit.
3. The UK in EU Climate Policy and Diplomacy
The following empirical discussion focuses on two areas
of EU climate governance: the EU ETS, and the EU’s role
in international climate negotiations. First, the ETS is a
key policy of the EU, and has been a source of policy
learning for other jurisdictions (Dupont et al., 2018; Jotzo
& Löschel, 2014). The ETS is simultaneously an internal
policy mechanism by which the EU aims to achieve its
GHG emission reduction goals, and an external gover-
nance tool held up as a model for other jurisdictions
(Dupont et al., 2018). By delving into detail on the UK’s
role in the reform of the ETS, we reveal the potential for
change, both in the instrument itself and in its role as
a policy model. Our analysis focuses on ETS policy de-
velopments since 2009, centred around raising the car-
bon price, rather than on the policy’s original adoption
or reforms made prior to the 2009 Copenhagen confer-
ence (see Section 3.2). We made this choice as Brexit is
most likely to affect how the EU approaches more recent
(and future) ETS-related policy questions. Second, we ex-
amine the international climate negotiations under the
UNFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which remains the most important venue where the
global community comes together to focus exclusively on
climate governance. The development of the EU’s role in
that forum, and the UK’s role in that development, forms
a key element of the EU’s climate diplomacy.
Understanding the UK’s role in these two areas is ex-
pected to reveal how Brexit could affect the EU’s role in
global climate governance. While the nature of the fu-
ture UK–EU relationship is as yet unknown (at the time of
writing), by identifying the UK’s contribution to the EU’s
approach to climate governance, we can begin to unpack
any repercussions from Brexit.
3.1. The UK as a Supporter of EU Climate Policy
The UK is widely seen as a well-informed and effec-
tive negotiator on climate and energy policy (Personal
Communications, 2 December 2016 and 20March 2019),
both within the EU and in the preparations for inter-
national negotiations. These perceptions are in keeping
with the UK’s wider effectiveness and influence in mul-
tilateral governance institutions (Dee & Smith, 2017). In
general, the UK has supported strong EU climate policy
and a clear leadership role in global climate governance
(Rayner & Jordan, 2017). The UK has repeatedly pushed
for more stringent EU GHG emissions reduction targets.
It supported increasing the 2020 GHG target from 20 to
30 per cent (compared to 1990 levels) following the 2009
climate negotiations in Copenhagen. It also proposed a
conditional 50 per cent EU GHG target for 2030 in prepa-
ration for the 2015 Paris Conference, and joined other
member states to support an increase in the 2030 target
above 40 per cent after the adoption of the 2015 Paris
Agreement (Department of Energy and Climate Change
[DECC], 2013; ENDS Europe, 2016).
But the UK did not support EU climate policy ef-
forts across the board—it pushed for its own preferences
on both EU GHG targets and on the choice of policy
instruments. The EU’s 2030 climate and energy frame-
work includes targets for increasing the share of renew-
able energy (to at least 32 per cent) and for improv-
ing energy efficiency (by at least 32.5 per cent). In line
with its focus on a ‘one-target’ policy discourse, the UK
supported removing the 2030 renewables target com-
pletely, opposed a binding target when its proposal for
removal failed, and argued for a flexible, indicative 2030
energy efficiency target (DECC, 2013, pp. 7–10; Fitch-Roy
& Fairbrass, 2018). Other historic examples show the
UK’s long-standing preference for a certain type of policy
instrument (generally, market mechanisms rather than
taxes and regulatory measures; see also De Ville & Siles-
Brügge, 2019; Roederer-Rynning & Matthews, 2019). In
the 1990s, the UK repeatedly blocked the adoption of
the 1992 EU CO2/energy tax proposal in the Council of
the EU (Rayner & Jordan, 2011; Walker, 1993). The pro-
posal was eventually abandoned, with several member
states opposing it, and policymaking focused on other ap-
proaches, especially on the ETS.
3.2. The UK and the EU ETS
The EU ETS contributes to the EU’s overarching goals to
reduce GHG emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 and by 40
per cent by 2030. The overarching EU GHG target is used
to determine the emissions reductions in both the EUETS,
covering approximately 45 per cent of emissions, and the
Effort Sharing Regulation, covering the remainder.
The ETS is a cap-and-trade system which sets a limit
(the cap) on the EU’s GHG emissions from electricity gen-
eration, intra-EU aviation, and energy-intensive indus-
tries such as steel, cement, oil refining, and pulp/paper
production. In 2018, this cap was set at 1.93 billion
tonnes of GHGs, mostly carbon dioxide. The cap is auto-
matically reduced by 1.74 per cent per year from 2013 to
2020 and by 2.2 per cent per year afterwards. For each
tonne of emissions allowed under the overall cap, the EU
allocates emission allowances directly to ETS sectors and
through auctioning. One allowancemust be surrendered
for each tonne of GHGs emitted. Each allowance can be
traded between organisations at the price determined
by the market (the carbon price or emission allowances
price). Most revenues from auctioning are transferred to
member state governments.
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In this section, we examine the UK’s role in the re-
form of this instrument, looking at the UK government’s
role in the Council and the role of UK members of the
European Parliament (EP). We also discuss the UK in
the Commission, while acknowledging the Commission’s
character as a supranational institution. The UK played a
key role in the adoption and reform of the ETS, and its
exit from the EU is likely to change related policy dynam-
ics (and thus also the contribution of the ETS to the EU’s
role in global climate governance).
3.2.1. The UK in the Council
Since 2010, the UK government has consistently sup-
ported a policy discourse centred on a ‘technology-
neutral’ approach to climate mitigation in the Council of
the EU and the European Council. This approach gives a
prominent role to the EU ETS and effort sharing in achiev-
ing climate mitigation goals (the ‘one-target approach’,
see Fitch-Roy & Fairbrass, 2018). The UK’s support for
the ETS also stems from it having long been a strong
proponent of market-based instruments (Würzel, 2008;
see also Roederer-Rynning &Matthews, 2019). However,
its wish to make the ETS and the GHG target the cen-
tre of internal EU climate policy has been complicated
by low carbon prices in the ETS driven by the European
economic crisis, and widespread resulting perceptions
that the ETS is failing to spur decarbonisation. The UK
has therefore been a key supporter of efforts to raise
ETS carbon prices (Jevnaker & Wettestad, 2017, p. 112;
Wettestad & Jevnaker, 2019, p. 120).
From May 2009 to March 2018, raising allowance
prices was a key focus of ETS policy making. Prices
dropped from €30 in June 2008 to below €10 between
2011 and 2018, with a low of €3 in April 2013. This was
caused in large part by the economic crisis from 2008,
which reduced emissions from ETS sectors. The resulting
allowance surplus (unused allowances) amounted to 2.1
billion allowances in 2013 (European Commission, 2018,
p. 29). The surplus reduced scarcity, leading to a reduc-
tion in prices. Proposals to intervene directly in the mar-
ket to raise prices—by, for example, setting a ‘price floor’
that would set aminimumprice—gained limited support
from the EU institutions (Personal Communications, 23
March 2017 and 31 March 2017). As a result, for actors
that supported raising allowance prices—including the
UK—attention focused on volume management, or, the
reduction of the number of allowances in circulation.
There were three major responses related to volume
management in the ETS from 2009 to 2018: backload-
ing, adopted in 2013, delayed the auctioning of 900 mil-
lion allowances until 2019–2020; the Market Stability
Reserve (MSR), adopted in 2015, automatically removed
allowances equal to 12 per cent of the allowance surplus
the prior year (including the backloaded allowances);
and changes in the MSR, adopted in 2018, doubled the
percentage of allowances to be removed to 24 per cent
until 2023 and created a process to cancel allowances in
the reserve starting in 2024 (Jevnaker&Wettestad, 2017;
Wettestad & Jevnaker, 2019).
The UK Government supported all three legislative
approaches to manage allowance volumes, as demon-
strated by the UK’s position in final Council votes on the
Backloading Decision, MSR Decision, and 2018 Directive,
and the UK’s position in the contentious general ap-
proach agreed in February 2017 in preparation for tri-
logues with the EP on the 2018 Directive. The UK’s pro-
posals sometimes went even farther than those of their
allies. For example, during the Backloading Decision de-
bates, theUKGovernment proposed that the backloaded
allowances be cancelled instead of delayed. It was also
the only member state that pushed for a conditional
50 per cent GHG target for 2030 in the European Council,
which would have reduced the ETS cap further.
ETS legislation has so far been adopted in the Council
with a significant majority. If the UK had not partici-
pated in these votes, the legislationwould still have been
adopted. However, looking only at the final votes ignores
the UK’s leadership role in pushing for volume manage-
ment proposals in the Council. For example, during the
negotiations for the 2018 Directive, the UK played an im-
portant role in the core group of volume-management
supporters (known as the like-minded group) consisting
of the UK, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Denmark,
and Luxembourg (Personal Communications, 20 March
2017 and 29 March 2017). Another group of mem-
ber states voted against both the final MSR Decision
(because they felt it was too stringent) and the 2018
Directive general approach (in response to the volume-
management provisions, especially cancellation). These
volume-management sceptics were Poland, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus. During 2018, the like-
minded group represented 35 per cent of the EU’s popu-
lation, compared to the volume-management sceptics at
15 per cent (Eurostat, 2019). The like-minded group had
32.3 per cent of Council votes versus 14.9 per cent for
the volume-management sceptics. Without the UK, the
gap in voting power between the two groupswould be re-
duced to 5.3 percentage points (Council of the EU, 2018).
3.2.2. The UK in the EP
The UK delegation in the EP is highly fragmented on is-
sues related to the ETS and volume management. Using
the Hix-Noury-Roland formula for party cohesion (Hix,
Noury, & Roland, 2007), VoteWatch Europe has calcu-
lated party and member state cohesion for the MSR
Decision and the 2018 Directive (VoteWatch Europe,
2015, 2018). The UK’s cohesion was 52 (out of a maxi-
mum of 100) for the MSR Decision (ranked 21 out of 28
member states) and 53 for the 2018 Directive (ranked 9,
with many member states having lower cohesion).
This contrasts with, and is in part due to, high levels
of cohesion within UK party groups. Of the ten UK politi-
cal parties in the EP, all but the Conservatives (European
Conservatives and Reformists) and Labour (Progressive
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Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) had 100 per cent
cohesion during the votes on the MSR and the 2018
Directive. The Conservatives (cohesion score of 82 for
both the MSR and the 2018 Directive) and Labour (100
for the MSR, 84 for the 2018 Directive) were still highly
cohesive on the final votes. The lack of cohesiveness for
the UK overall is because these highly cohesive party
groups voted in different directions. All UK parties ex-
cept for the UK Independence Party voted for the MSR
Decision, while six parties overwhelmingly voted for the
2018 Directive and four overwhelmingly voted against
or abstained.
This has also meant that UK representatives in the
Council and Parliament have often had difficulty coor-
dinating. For example, an initial vote on backloading
in the Parliament in April 2013 led to its (narrow and
temporary) rejection. During that vote, 20 of the 24
Conservative members of the EP voted against backload-
ing, despite the fact that theUKGovernment, led by their
political party, strongly supported the measure (ENDS
Report, 2013).
3.2.3. The UK in the European Commission
The European Commission has been a central policy ac-
tor in the adoption and subsequent reform of the ETS
(Skjærseth, 2017; Skjærseth & Wettestad, 2010). The
Commission holds the right to initiate legislative propos-
als. In climate policy, prompts for a policy initiative have
frequently flowed from the European Council. In thisway,
UK national preferences (e.g., on choice of policy instru-
ment) can be passed to the Commission. Unlike in the
Council and the Parliament, Commisson officials repre-
sent the EU, not their member state. Commission of-
ficials from the UK in the Directorate-General for the
Environment and (from 2010) the Directorate-General
for Climate Action have played key roles, including co-
ordinating the original 2003 ETS Directive and the im-
portant centralising reforms under the 2009 Directive,
as well as more recent roles in the Cabinet of the
Climate Commissioner (Delbeke et al., 2006; Personal
Communications, 18 May 2016 and 20 May 2016).
While Dehousse and Thompson (2012) found that some
Commission officials hold ‘intergovernmentalist’ views,
namely that member states are ultimately in the lead
of European integration processes, such views do not
mean these officials (can) promote national interests in
policy design. It is, therefore, difficult to isolate a particu-
lar influence on the Commision via UK nationals working
there. At the time of writing, uncertainty persists about
whether officials of British nationality will remain in the
Commission after Brexit (e.g., Tamma, 2018).
3.3. The UK and the EU’s Role in International Climate
Negotiations
In 2019, the EU remains a key actor in the international
climate negotiations. The EU has consistently engaged
in efforts to push UNFCCC Parties to adopt strong cli-
mate targets and credible policymeasures since the early
1990s. It has regularly been described as a leader in the
international negotiations, both for its capacity to bro-
ker compromise (a capacity that has expanded since its
disappointing performance during the 2009 Copenhagen
negotiations) and to lead by example through its own
policymaking (Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013; Groen &
Niemann, 2013; Wurzel et al., 2017). The UK has been
an active player in the development of the EU’s role in
global climate governance. As with its role in internal cli-
mate policy, the UK has regularly pushed for ambitious
global climate agreements, and it has been an impor-
tant voice in the development of EU negotiating strate-
gies (Rayner & Jordan, 2017; Personal Communication,
20 March 2019). The history of the UK in the develop-
ment of the EU’s global role has not always been smooth
sailing, but the general direction of UK influence has con-
sistently been towards a strong, leading position.
In the 1990s, the EU was not the unified interna-
tional actor we see today. It had little autonomy, volition,
negotiating capability, or ability to deploy policy instru-
ments (Vogler, 2017). In international climate negotia-
tions, the EU relied on itsmember states to fill these gaps.
An entrepreneurial Commission worked hard to advance
internal policy (Collier, 1996; Pollack, 1994; Wettestad,
2005), and willing member states negotiated at the in-
ternational level in the name of the EU. Contrary to the
EU’s slow climate diplomatic development, the UK was
far more engaged in the process leading to the adoption
of the UNFCCC in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Rayner
& Jordan, 2011). Michael Howard, the UK’s Environment
Secretary at the time, has been credited with playing an
important role in ensuring agreement on the UNFCCC
in 1992 (Haigh, 1996; Rayner & Jordan, 2011). Leading
up to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the
EU stepped up its ambition. It demonstrated its engage-
ment by adopting the most ambitious reduction target
of all parties signed up to the Kyoto Protocol—namely
to reduce its GHG emissions by eight per cent between
2008 and 2012, compared to 1990 levels. It took some
time before the EU agreed on sufficient policies to im-
plement its target (the early 2000s). While EU leadership
in the 1990s is often characterised as ‘rhetorical’ (or as-
pirational), there was strong engagement from the UK
(Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008).
The 2000s began with a setback in international cli-
mate governance when the US withdrew from the Kyoto
Protocol in 2001. The EU and its member states stepped
up to ‘champion’ the Protocol’s entry into force and to fo-
cusmore efforts on developing a credible leadership role.
Internally, the EU adopted a suite of policy measures be-
tween 2000 and 2010, and agreed on its 20 per cent
GHG target for 2020 in 2007 (European Council, 2007;
Oberthür & Pallemaerts, 2010). It also paid far more at-
tention to increasing its effectiveness in international ne-
gotiations: by ensuring a unified message at the negoti-
ations, coordinated among EU members; by building EU
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negotiating capacity; by developing a system of lead ne-
gotiators to ensure continuity; and by continuing to pro-
vide an ‘example’. These efforts also stemmed from the
experience, in 2000, of the UK’s efforts to build bridges
with the US. Rather than working with the EU to try to
bring the US on board in climate governance, the UK by-
passed the then French Presidency to reach out to theUS
at negotiations in the Hague (van Schaik, 2010). Towards
the end of the decade, the EU faced a demoralising
blow when the Copenhagen climate negotiations failed
to adopt a new international agreement in 2009. This cli-
mate conference provided lessons for the EU in how to
project its leadership ambitions, and to gain followers.
By the 2010s, the global climate governance con-
text had changed. In terms of share of global GHG emis-
sions, the twomajor players were the US and China: GHG
emissions from these two countries alone accounted for
about 40 per cent of global emissions (World Resources
Institute, 2019). While these new ‘climate geopolitics’
did not deter the EU from taking action on climate
change, they did provide pause for reflection and adap-
tation (Oberthür, 2016). Moving on from Copenhagen,
we see awell-oiled EUnegotiatingmachinery developing.
The EU has a strong climate diplomacy practice, combin-
ing efforts at the negotiating table with bilateral diplo-
matic and capacity-building efforts (Dupont et al., 2018).
It engages in coalition building with other parties before,
during and after international negotiations. It agrees on a
single message in preparation for the negotiations, and
regularly calls for more ambition. By the time of the in-
ternational negotiations in Paris 2015, the EU was well
placed to build on the momentum of the previous years
to support the ‘high ambition coalition’. This coalition
was key for the adoption in the Paris Agreement of the
goal of ensuring that global temperature increase re-
mains ‘well below’ 2° Celsius (UN, 2015). The UK’s role
was as one member of the EU. While it played an impor-
tant role in the internal negotiations on the EU’s 2030 cli-
mate and energy framework (see above), it was less visi-
ble on the international stage. This is not unusual, as the
EU has developed its role such that member states (usu-
ally) do not pursue separate negotiating strategies. The
UK still plays an important role internationally because
of its administrative and negotiating capacity, which as-
sists the development of the EU’s negotiating stance. The
UK’s international diplomatic network, and its history as
a cooperative member of the UN and the UN Security
Council (Dee & Smith, 2017) has also allowed it to prop-
agate the EU stance towards climate change in its own
external relations.
4. Changes in the EU’s Role in Global Climate
Governance after Brexit
The UK has been important in the development of the
EU’s role in global climate governance. First, the UK’s posi-
tion in EU internal policymaking has usually been in favour
of ambitious GHG emission reduction targets. While the
UK’s preferred policy choice has not always been adopted
(e.g., three targets were adopted instead of the UK’s pre-
ferred one target approach for the 2030 climate and en-
ergy framework), the UK has certainly been instrumental
in developing the ETS. The UK was a vocal opponent of
the CO2/energy tax proposal in the 1990s and was a key
pusher of the ETS reforms. Second, the UK has been cen-
tral to the development of EU capacity in international
negotiations. The UK’s diplomatic capacity, its permanent
seat on the UN Security Council and its close diplomatic
ties provide a solid platform for promoting climate action.
As the EU improved its external diplomatic efforts, it drew
on the UK’s expertise until the EU became a more uni-
fied international actor (Vogler, 2017). The UK also played
an important role in shaping the EU’s negotiating strat-
egy (Rayner & Jordan, 2017; Personal Communication,
20March 2019). As such, theUKacted as a ‘pivotal outlier’
on different occasions in climate governance: by pushing
for more ambitious policies and negotiation outcomes,
and by objecting to certain policy directions.
What then can we expect for the EU’s role in global
climate governance after Brexit? While the past is not
an accurate predictor of the future, we reflect on the
changes that have already occurred. We suggest that
change is most likely to occur in a slow, but iterative fash-
ion, which could lead to long-term divergence in policy
ambition/direction and international positions between
the UK and the EU. The extent of such a divergence is
unclear, as it is likely to depend on the degree of cooper-
ation and alignment that is sought in the future UK–EU
relationship, the UK’s own global ambitions and internal
developments/reform within the EU (Falkner, 2016).
An immediate effect of Brexit, regardless of the fu-
ture EU–UK relationship, is in the balance of interests in
EU internal policymaking. The UK will no longer partic-
ipate in decision making in the EU institutions. The ef-
fects of Brexit may be more pronounced in the Council,
where the UK government votes as a unitary actor, than
in the Parliament, where party fragmentation in the UK
delegation and difficulties coordinating with the govern-
ment have led to lower cohesion for the UK delegation.
In the short to medium term, the UK Government’s ab-
sence from the Council will weaken coalitions in favour of
higher prices in the ETS, by reducing the size of the coali-
tion championing these changes (the like-minded group),
and by removing the UK as a voice for the most radi-
cal options.
If the UK and the EU remain closely connected in cli-
mate governance, by aligning policy and continuing to
work together in international negotiations, we should
expect no sudden change in the EU’s global role. If the
UK were to be a member of the European Economic
Area, for example, it would remain in the ETS and sev-
eral other EU climate policies. However, even under this
scenario, there is still likely to be change over time. With
an agreed exit deal, the UK may still only remain a mem-
ber of the ETS until the end of the 2020 trading period
(Twidale, 2019). Further, if the UK is not obliged to re-
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port to the European Commission on policy implementa-
tion, there is no reason why the UK would not ratchet
up or down its own ambition, leading to divergence
between the EU and the UK internal climate ambition
(Burns, Gravey, Jordan, & Zito, 2019). In June 2019, the
UK adopted a ‘net zero’ GHG emissions target for 2050,
sending a signal that strong climate action is a UK priority
(UK Government, 2019). Given the role of the UK in push-
ing for ambitious policy on GHG emission reductions and
on strengthening the ETS, we could imagine that EU cli-
mate policy may move forward less urgently, having lost
the UK as an important advocate. Further, Brexit is likely
to lead to painful internal discussions about the redistri-
bution of efforts among the remaining 27 members to
achieve the 2030 goals. In turn, the effects of policy di-
vergencemay temper the contribution of EU internal pol-
icy to upholding a credible leadership role in global gov-
ernance. Divergence in international negotiations is also
likely to result over time, as policy preferences internally
in the EU affect its negotiating strategy internationally.
Therefore, even with close alignment and cooperation,
we would nevertheless expect the EU’s role in global cli-
mate governance to change in the long term as a result
of small but cumulative changes in its: (1) internal policy;
(2) climate diplomacy; and (3) ability to attract followers.
If the UK and the EU were to part on acrimonious
terms, the effects are likely to be felt sooner. An exit with-
out a deal, which is an increasingly likely scenario at the
time of writing, and a poor relationship between the EU
and the UK more generally, would make it less likely that
the two parties would work closely in international cli-
mate negotiations and in aligning their policies. At the
international level, this would be felt in the EU by a sud-
den disconnect from the UK’s diplomatic network and ca-
pacity. However, this effect is still expected to be small
at first, as the EU’s own network and capacity has been
significantly strengthened over the years. Furthermore,
within the context of group politics in UN settings, it may
remain in the UK’s interest to pursue close ties with the
EU to amplify any joint message in climate negotiations
(Dee & Smith, 2017). In this scenario, the UK becomes
one more party with whom the EU needs to negotiate,
but there may not be any special partnership. Alignment
is likely to be far more ad hoc. For internal policy, EU law
on the ETS and other climate policies would immediately
cease to apply to the UK, making short-term divergence
more likely. Indeed, indications from the UKGovernment
show its intention to leave the ETS and install a carbon
tax as early as 4 November 2019, and to prepare its own
ETS (if there is no deal). While this seems to show lit-
tle appetite for alignment, the UK ETS may link with the
EU ETS in the future (Twidale, 2019). Over the long term,
whether there is a sudden departure without a deal, or a
managed UK exit, there will regardless be cumulative ef-
fects: A sudden, no-deal exit will mean that these effects
will likely be felt sooner.
How the EU and the UK will manage these changes
remains to be seen, and will also likely depend on the na-
ture of the future relationship. Under the first scenario
of a cooperative future relationship, management strate-
gies are less urgent. Cooperation and EU–UK diplomatic
channels would remain open, and the divergence that
occurs would likely be predictable and stepwise, mak-
ing management planning feasible. An acrimonious and
sudden Brexit pits the UK and EU into traditional inter-
national relations, where diplomatic channels based on
EU membership are no longer guaranteed. This second
scenario may lead to rivalry between the EU and the UK,
which could result in ‘rivalrous emulation’ pushing the
EU andUK towards ever higher levels of climate ambition
through their competition for leadership status (Coetzee,
2018). The adoption of the UK’s 2050 net-zero emissions
target may provide a first glimpse of what this type of ri-
valry could entail. Or the rivalry could shift a focus away
from climate issues tomore traditional international rela-
tions concerns (security, trade), leading to a general low-
ering of ambition on both sides.
In both scenarios, the long-term effects of Brexit
on the EU’s role in global climate governance are more
substantial than its short-term effects. Brexit is unlikely
to immediately affect the three main conditions for
the EU’s leadership role in global climate governance
overnight: (1) credible and ambitious internal climate
policy; (2) constant and effective international engage-
ment through climate diplomacy at multilateral and bi-
lateral levels; (3) the ability to attract followers (Dupont
et al., 2018; Wurzel et al., 2017). The institutional and
decision-making structure of the EU ensures some conti-
nuity (Pollack, 2009).
Finally, it is important to note that the EU’s future
role in global climate governance will not develop in a
vacuum. Brexit is only one factor that could change the
dynamics of its role. Other parties (e.g., China, India, the
US, and Brazil) and their relationship with the EU (and
the UK) can play as significant a role (if not more so), in
global climate governance (Schreurs, 2016). As the inter-
national context shifts, the EU without the UK may sim-
ply find itself a shrinking global actor, a position that is
more dependent on the role taken up by other major
emitters than on the relationship with the UK. Arguably,
the urgent risk to EU leadership in global climate gov-
ernance is more likely to stem from wider issues of EU
unity than from Brexit (Skovgaard, 2014). In the June
2019 European Council meeting, for example, member
states were unable to agree on the goal of achieving cli-
mate neutrality by 2050, with opposition from Czechia,
Estonia, Hungary and Poland (European Council, 2019).
5. Conclusion
The EU’s role in global climate governance is the re-
sult of decades of learning, capacity building, internal
policy development and climate diplomacy. Throughout
this time, the UK has been an important actor, both
in terms of internal climate policy development and in
terms of the EU’s global climate role. It contributed to
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the agreement of EU climate targets and regularly sup-
ported more ambition. It blocked the adoption of an EU
CO2/energy tax, but pushed for the ETS. It called for a
one-target approach to climate policy. And the UK has
been a key player in the development, adoption and im-
plementation of the EU’s international climate negotiat-
ing strategy.
Brexit is expected to affect the EU’s global climate
role through cumulative changes that will play out over
the long term.Without theUK, the fulfilment of the three
main conditions for leadership are relatively unchanged
in the short term. For the first condition—credible and
ambitious internal climate policy—Brexit will not now
change the policy choices and targets adopted by the
EU to 2030, although the issue of implementation af-
ter Brexit will need to be addressed. For condition
two—constant and effective international engagement
through climate diplomacy at multilateral and bilateral
levels—the EUhas developed good practices, experience
and capabilities, although itmay have to adapt to the loss
of UK diplomats and negotiators. For condition three—
the ability to attract followers—the EU’s record has been
relatively poor when it comes to others adopting strong
targets, and it is hard to see how to Brexit would change
that (for better or worse). However, the EU’s policy port-
folio is still a source of learning, and that is unlikely to
change suddenly after Brexit.
Instead, the cumulative effect of changes in policy
preferences, negotiation strategy, ambition, and diplo-
macy efforts are likely to lead to growing divergence be-
tween the UK and the EU on climate governance in the
long term.Whether this results in a situation of rivalrous
emulation (Coetzee, 2018) where the EU and UK try to
outdo each other on effective climate governance, or re-
sults in a downgrading of ambition and leadership in cli-
mate governance, depends on awide range of factors, in-
cluding the international context and EU unity. However,
the continuity provided by the EU’s decision-making and
institutional structure may reduce the risk of drastic and
sudden changes to the EU’s role in global climate gover-
nance after Brexit.
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